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WHEN RULES ARE MORE IMPORTANT
THAN JUSTICE
Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1460 (1996)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Carlisle v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court held
that a federal district court lacked the authority to grant a motion for
judgment of acquittal filed one day after the expiration of the time
period prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c). Rule
29(c) requires that when a jury has returned a guilty verdict, motions
for judgment of acquittal must be filed within seven days of the jury's
discharge.2 The Supreme Court found that the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (the "Rules") prohibit a trial court from granting
an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal.3 In addition, the Court
found that a district court does not possess an inherent supervisory
power that would allow it to enter a post-verdictjudgment of acquittal
sua sponte.
4
This note argues that the Supreme Court correctly found that the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not permit the granting of an
untimely post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal. Rule 29(c),
when read in conjunction with Rule 45 (b), prohibits a trial court from
granting a motion for judgment of acquittal filed after the expiration
of the seven-day time period included in Rule 29(c), unless the court
has extended the time limit during the seven days. However, this note
also argues that the Supreme Court erred when it rejected the exist-
ence of an inherent supervisory power as an alternative authority for
the trial court's action. The Court justified its decision by noting the
absence of any long, unquestioned power of federal district courts to
acquit for insufficient evidence sua sponte after return of a guilty ver-
dict. However, there is a tradition of entrusting lower courts with the
responsibility of ensuring justice and protecting innocent criminal de-
fendants from wrongful convictions. The Court's refusal to acknowl-
edge this tradition of supervisory power led to the incarceration of a
1 116 S. Ct. 1460 (1996).
2 FED. R. CRiM. P. 29(c).
3 116 S. Ct. at 1464.
4 Id. at 1467.
1040
UNTIMELY RULE 29(c) MOTIONS
man whom the trial judge believed was innocent.
II. BACKGROUND
A. RULE 2 AS A GUIDE TO INTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective on
March 21, 1946. 5 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 2 explains the
purpose of the Rules. 6 The Rules were adopted for three main rea-
sons. The first reason for the adoption of the Rules is to "secure sim-
plicity in procedure."7 The courts have reached the goal of
simplifying procedure by finding that the Rules were designed to abol-
ish the technicalities which led to the dismissal of cases or the reversal
of convictions for reasons unconnected with the guilt or innocence of
the defendant.8 The second reason for the promulgation of the Fed-
eral Rules is to ensure "fairness in administration."9 This purpose of
the Rules has been cited tojustify the establishment of uniform proce-
dures among the district courts to ensure the equal treatment of every
defendant.10 The final reason given for the adoption of the Rules is
to eliminate "unjustifiable expense and delay."" The Supreme Court
has accepted this purpose of the Rules as expressed in Rule 2. In
Bruton v. United States,'2 the Supreme Court opined that the Rules are
intended to promote economy and efficiency so long as the rights of
the defendant are not compromised.' 3 In interpreting Rule 2, the
Supreme Court also said that the Rules "were designed to eliminate
technicalities in criminal pleading and are to be construed to secure
simplicity in procedure."' 4 In Fallen v. United States,15 the Court stated
that Rule 2 makes clear that the Criminal Rules "are not, and were not
5 4 LESTER B. ORFIELD & MARK S. RHODES, ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES § 29:5, at 511 (2d ed. 1987).
6 FED. R. CRiM. P. 2. Rule 2 is analogous to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which
states that the Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
7 FED. R. CRIM. P. 2.
8 Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959) ("[C]onvictions are no longer reversed
because of minor and technical deficiencies which did not prejudice the accused.").
9 FED. R. GRIM. P. 2.
10 Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ("[T]he decisions of the
Supreme Court require that the interpretation of the Rules... assure 'to the greatest
degree possible' 'equal treatment for every litigant' before the bar of criminal justice, re-
gardless of financial ability.") (citations omitted).
1 1 FED. R. CRIM. P. 2.
12 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
is Id. at 131 n.6.
14 United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953).
15 378 U.S. 139 (1964).
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intended to be, a rigid code to have an inflexible meaning irrespective
of the circumstances."'
6
B. FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 29
When promulgated, Rule 29 (a) abolished the common law mo-
tion for a directed verdict and replaced it with the motion for judg-
ment of acquittal.17 The change in name did not alter the purpose or
scope of the motion.' Rule 29(a) allows the trial court to enter a
judgment of acquittal if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a convic-
tion of the offense. 19 The 1966 amendments to Rule 29 divided sub-
section (b) into sections (b) and (c).20 Currently, section (b) gives
the trial court the authority to defer its decision on a motion forjudg-
ment of acquittal made at the close of the government's case or at the
close of all of the evidence.2 ' Rule 29(b) allows the court to "decide
the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a
verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict."22
However, if the court defers decision on the motion, the court must
"decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling
was reserved."23 Section (c) provides that a defendant may enter a
motion for judgment of acquittal if ajury enters a guilty verdict or is
discharged without having returned a verdict.2 4 Prior to 1966, many
believed that a defendant had to move forjudgment of acquittal at the
close of all the evidence to preserve the right to make the motion
again after the jury's discharge.25 The amended Rule makes it possi-
16 1& at 142.
17 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a) provides:
Motions for directed verdict are abolished and motions forjudgment of acquittal shall
be used in their place. The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall
order the entry ofjudgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indict-
ment or information after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insuf-
ficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a).
18 FED. i CRIM. P. 29 advisory committee's note.
19 FED. R. CRiM. P. 29(a).
20 FED. R- GRIM. P. 29 advisory committee's note.
21 FED. R- CRIM. P. 29(b).
22 IdL
23 Id
24 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) provides:
If the jury returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict,
a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the
jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day
period. If a verdict of guilty is returned the court may on such motion set aside the
verdict and enter judgment of acquittal .... It shall not be necessary to the making of
such a motion that a similar motion has been made prior to the submission of the case
to the jury.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c).
25 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 465 (1982).
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ble, however, to file a motion for judgment of acquittal after the jury's
discharge regardless of whether the motion was made before submis-
sion to the jury.26 The 1966 amendments also extended the time pe-
riod during which one must file a motion forjudgment of acquittal to
seven days after the jury's discharge. 27
The judgment of acquittal is intended to protect innocent de-
fendants from juries that might find them guilty despite insufficient
evidence. 28 A court cannot direct a verdict of guilty because that
would violate a criminal defendant's right to trial byjury.29 A defend-
ant may move for judgment of acquittal at the close of the govern-
ment's case, once all of the evidence has been presented, or within
the required time period after the jury's discharge.30 Regardless of
when the motion is made, the appropriate standard to assess the mo-
tion is whether the government presented evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding of guilt.3 ' If a jury returns a guilty verdict, the
government can appeal a trial court's order granting a motion for
judgment of acquittal because a successful appeal by the government
would not necessitate a retrial in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.3 2 Instead, the appeals court would remand the case for rein-
statement of the jury verdict.33 A trial court may also enter a judg-
ment of acquittal if the jury is discharged without returning a
verdict.3 4 However, the government cannot appeal ajudgment of ac-
quittal made in cases where the jury failed to reach a verdict because a
successful appeal would result in the need for a retrial in violation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.3 5
C. FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 45
Rule 45 deals with the administration of the time limits embodied
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.s6 Rule 45(a) addresses
how time periods should be computed under the Federal Rules.37
Rule 45 (a) provides in pertinent part, "When a period of time pre-
scribed or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sun-
26 FED. R. Qum. P. 29 advisory committee's note.
27 Id.
28 2 WiuOHT, supra note 25, § 461.
29 Id.; U.S. CONsr. amend. VI.
30 FED. R. GRIM. P. 29(a) and 29(c).
SI United States v. Ubl, 472 F. Supp. 1236, 1237 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
32 United States v. Sharif, 817 F.2d 1375, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987); U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 Sharif, 817 F.2d at 1376.
3 FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c).
35 Sharif, 817 F.2d at 1376.




days and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation." s3
Section (b) of Rule 45 authorizes courts to extend time limits in cer-
tain situations.3 9 The limitations on enlargement found in Rule 45 (b)
have been strictly construed. 40 Rule 45(b) states:
When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion... (2)
upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit
the act to be done if the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect;
but the court may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules
29, 33, 34, and 35, except to the extent and under the conditions stated
in them.
4'
D. THE ROLE OF AN "INHERENT SUPERVISORY POWER" IN MODERN
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
McNabb v. United States42 is thought to be the first case in which
the Supreme Court relied on its "supervisory power" to justify a deci-
sion.43 In McNabb, police officers obtained a confession from suspects
after unremittingly interrogating them.44 As a result, the Court ex-
cluded evidence obtained in violation of a federal statute that made
certain investigative techniques unlawful.45 The Court asserted that it
possessed the authority to establish "civilized standards of procedure
and evidence" for the federal courts. 46 Specifically, the Court rea-
soned that "[i]n the exercise of its supervisory authority over the ad-
ministration of criminal justice in the federal courts" it was "guided by
considerations ofjustice not limited to the strict canons of evidentiary
relevance. '47 After McNabb, the Supreme Court repeatedly relied on
its supervisory power to remedy potential injustices 48 and to preserve
38 Id.
39 FED. R. CuM. P. 45(b).
40 See, e.g., United States v. Granville, 456 F.2d 1073, 1073 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that
the district court had no jurisdiction to consider defendant's motion to modify sentence
filed 20 months after the sentencing when the Rules allow only 120 days in which to make
this motion); Allison v. United States, 358 F.2d 60, 62 (7th Cir. 1966) (holding that pursu-
ant to Rule 45(b) the district court did not have the authority to extend the time period in
which a defendant could move for a new trial), vacated on other grounds, 386 U.S. 13 (1967).
41 FED. R. GluM. P. 45(b).
42 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
43 Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Superisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1435 (1984).
44 McNabb, 318 U.S. at 332.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 340.
47 Id. at 341.
48 Beale, supra note 43, at 1449; see also Gaca v. United States, 411 U.S. 618 (1973)
(reinstating an appeal where a defendant did not know he was required to pay a $25 filing
fee despite being authorized to file an appeal in a forma pauperis); Yates v. United States,
356 U.S. 363 (1958) (reducing sentence for criminal contempt to time served); Calvaresi v.
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the integrity of the courts.49
After McNabb, the federal appellate courts also began relying on
their supervisory power to justify decisions. For example, in Helwig v.
United States,50 the Sixth Circuit ordered a new trial to allow a defend-
ant to introduce exculpatory evidence even though the evidence was
not newly discovered.5 1 The court based its order for a new trial on its
supervisory power.52 The Sixth Circuit cited McNabb to justify its "ex-
ercise of judicial supervision [over] the administration of criminal
justice."53
Many courts of appeals have recognized that courts must possess
a supervisory power to ensure that justice is done.54 For example, in
United States v. Brown,55 the Seventh Circuit utilized its supervisory
power to require federal district courts faced with deadlocked juries to
issue jury instructions in compliance with the standards suggested in
an American Bar Association publication.56 The Second Circuit relied
on its supervisory power in United States v. D'angiolillo,57 when it re-
fused to dismiss indictments that were partially based on unlawfully
collected evidence. 58 Instead, the court cited the best interest of the
public and excluded the illegal evidence.59
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 12, 1993, Petitioner Charles Carlisle was charged with
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.60 On July 13, 1993, the district court jury
United States, 348 U.S. 961 (1955) (reversing convictions of trial court and ordering retrial
before another judge where the record revealed tension throughout the trial between the
defense counsel and the court).
49 Beale, supra note 43, at 1452 (citingjury selection cases including Thiel v. Southern
Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946) (reversing the judgment despite absence of prejudice
because wage earners had been excluded from the jury list); Ballard v. United States, 329
U.S. 187, 197-98 (1946) (Frankfurter dissenting) (agreeing to consider defendant's objec-
tion to the exclusion of women from thejury despite the fact that the defendant had failed
to raise the objection below).
50 162 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1947).
51 Id. at 840.
52 I&
53 1& at 840 n.1.
54 See Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1973) (including an
extensive list of cases where various courts have relied on their "supervisory power").
55 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969).
56 Id. at 933.
57 340 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1965).
58 Id. at 456.
59 I1.




found Carlisle guilty as charged.6' After learning the jury's verdict,
Carlisle and his attorney decided to file a motion for a judgment of
acquittal. Rule 29 states that motions for judgment of acquittal that
are filed after ajury verdict may be filed within seven days of the jury
verdict or within such further time as the court may fix during the
seven-day period.62 The time limit embodied in Rule 29 does not in-
clude weekends63 and thus, Rule 29 required Carlisle to file his mo-
tion on or before July 22, 1993.64 On July 23, 1993, Carlisle, through
his court-appointed attorney, filed a motion for judgment of acquittal
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (c) .65 Carlisle con-
tended that the government had not introduced sufficient evidence to
prove that Carlisle knowingly participated in the alleged conspiracy.
66
On August 19, 1993, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Michigan denied Carlisle's motion for judgment of acquit-
tal finding that the trial produced adequate evidence to justify a guilty
verdict. 67 In its opinion, the district court did not discuss the signifi-
cance of the motion being filed more than seven days after the jury
verdict.68 After denying the motion, the trial judge received a copy of
the presentence investigation report which revealed that Carlisle had
received the Bronze Star for his service in Vietnam.69 On October 14,
1993, the day set for Carlisle's sentencing, the district court, on its own
motion, reversed its earlier ruling and granted Carlisle's motion for
judgment of acquittal.70 In the written opinion, the district court
stated that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
"that Carlisle 'knowingly and voluntarily' joined the conspiracy." 71
The district court acknowledged in a footnote that the motion was
filed one day late, but the judge refused to deny the motion on that
ground.72 The trial judge treated the motion as timely filed because
he believed that the "refusal to hear this motion would result in grave
injustice."73 After granting the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge
61 United States v. Carlisle, 48 F.3d 190, 191 (6th Cir. 1995).
62 FED. K CRIM. P. 29(c).
63 FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(a).
64 Brief for the United States at 6 n.2, Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1460 (1996)
(No. 94-9247).
65 id. at 5.
66 Id.
67 Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1460 (1996) (No. 94-
9247).
68 Id.
69 Brief for the United States at 8, Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1460 (1996) (No.
94-9247).
70 United States v. Carlisle, 48 F.Sd 190, 191 (6th Cir. 1995).
71 Id
72 Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1460, 1463 (1996).
73 Id
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added that "[t]he [c]lourt doesn't meet too many Bronze Star recipi-
ents" and then thanked Carlisle for his service in Vietnam.74 The gov-
ernment appealed the judgment of acquittal to the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.75 The Sixth Circuit
reversed the judgment of acquittal and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for sentencing.76 The appeals court noted that Carlisle
filed his motion for judgment of acquittal one day late.77 Accordingly,
the Sixth Circuit found that the District Court erred in granting the
motion for acquittal because "under Rule 29, it is beyond the court's
jurisdiction to grant an untimely motion for acquittal."78 In addition,
the Sixth Circuit stated that a court cannot "enter a judgment of ac-
quittal sua sponte after the case has been submitted to thejury."79 The
appeals court relied on United States v. Davis,80 which held that a dis-
trict court does not have inherent supervisory power even when used
in an attempt to correct manifest injustice.8 ' The Supreme Court
granted Carlisle's Petition for Certiorari on September 27, 1995.82
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,83 affirmed the decision of
the Sixth Circuit.84 The Court found that the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure do not allow a district court to grant a motion forjudg-
ment of acquittal that was not filed within the required timeperiod.8 5
In addition, the majority determined that a district court does not pos-
sess an inherent supervisory power that gives it the authority to enter a
sua sponte judgment of acquittal.8 6 Consequently, the district court
lacked authority to grant Carlisle's motion for judgment of acquittal
that was filed one day after the expiration of the time period pre-
74 Brief for the United States at 8, Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1460 (1996) (No.
94-9247).
75 United States v. Carlisle, 48 F.3d 190, 191 (6th Cir. 1995).




80 992 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993).
81 Id. at 640.
82 Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 40 (1995).
83 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
BreyerjoinedJustice Scalia in the majority opinion. Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. Ct.
1460, 1462 (1996).
84 Id. at 1470.
85 Id. at 1464.
86 Id. at 1466.
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scribed by Rule 29(c). 87
Justice Scalia began by observing that the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure are clear and unambiguous. 88 Specifically, he focused
on the plain language of Rule 29 which sets a seven-day time limit 89 on
filing motions for judgment of acquittal when the jury has returned a
guilty verdict.90 In addition, Justice Scalia noted that Rule 45(b) states
that "the court may not extend the time for taking any action under
Rul[e] 29 ... except to the extent and under the conditions stated in
[the Rule]."91 After reviewing the text of these two Rules, Justice
Scalia concluded that the Rules did not give the trial court discretion
to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal filed after the expiration
of the seven-day period.92
The majority then responded to the Petitioner's argument that
Rule 29(a) affords district courts the power to enter a judgment of
acquittal sua sponte at any time before sentencing.93 The Court re-
jected the petitioner's arguments on three grounds. First, noting that
Rule 29(a) is entitled "Motion Before Submission to jury," the Court
rejected the notion that Congress intended the Rule to allow a court
to enter a sua spontejudgment of acquittal at any point up until sen-
tencing. 94 Second, justice Scalia pointed out that the Petitioner's in-
terpretation of Rule 29 would allow a trial court to enter a judgment
of acquittal beyond the time when defense counsel could move for the
very samejudgment.95 As support, justice Scalia reviewed United States
v. Smith,96 in which the Court stated, "[I]t would be a strange rule
which deprived a judge of power to do what was asked when request
was made by the person most concerned, and yet allowed him to act
without petition."97 justice Scalia suggested that the interpretation as-
serted by Carlisle might "subject trial judges to private appeals."98
Rule 29(b) 99 would serve no purpose if the court could enter ajudg-
87 Id- at 1470.
88 Id. at 1464.
89 Rule 29(c) provides for additional time to file the motion if the court granted addi-
tional time before the expiration of the seven day period.
90 Carise, 116 S. Ct. at 1463.
91 Id. at 1463-64 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CrM. P. 45(b)).




96 331 U.S. 469 (1947).
97 Carlse, 116 S. Ct. at 1464 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 381 U.S. at 474).
98 Id. (quoting Smith, 331 U.S. at 474).
99 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(b) allows a court to reserve decision on the
motion for judgment of acquittal and decide it after submission to the jury.
1048 [Vol. 87
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ment of acquittal at any time before sentencing.100 As a result of the
section headings of Rule 29, the consequences of the interpretation
suggested by the Petitioner, and the import of Rule 29(b), the major-
ity concluded that Rule 29(a) and (b) apply to motions made before
submission to the jury, and subsections (c) and (d) apply to motions
made after the jury's discharge. 1 1
Finally, the Court focused on the language of Rule 29 (c) to prove
that a trial court lacked the power to enter a sua spcmtejudgment of
acquittal after the case's submission to the jury.10 2 The majority re-
jected the argument that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 2103 per-
mitted the court to grant an untimely motion for judgment of
acquittal. 04 The opinion explained that Rule 2 is a guiding principle
which should only be used when the Rules are unclear.10 5 Because of
the unambiguous nature of Rules 29 and 45, the Court determined
that Rule 2 was not applicable. 10 6 Justice Scalia distinguished one
case' 07 that used Rule 2 to depart from time limits imposed by the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.108 The Court also denied that
Rule 57109 applied because Rule 29 provides for the length of time
allowed to file a motion forjudgment of acquittal and, therefore, gov-
erned the issue.110
The majority next rejected the Petitioner's argument that the dis-
trict court possessed an "inherent supervisory power" that allowed it to
100 Carlsle 116 S. Ct. at 1464.
101 I&
102 Id. at 1465.
103 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 2 provides: "These rules are intended to pro-
vide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to
secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifi-
able expense and delay."
104 Cardie, 116 S. Ct. at 1465.
105 Id-
106 Id.
107 Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139 (1964). In Fa/en, an incarcerated paraplegic
pro se petitioner failed to file a notice of appeal within the time limit provided in Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(a). However, the petitioner had mailed a notice of appeal
to the court clerk's office two days before the time limit expired. The Court, citing Rule 2,
overlooked the defendant's failure to file in a timely fashion stating that the peitioner "had
done all that could reasonably be expected." Id. at 144.
108 Car/ise, 116 S. Ct. at 1465 (stating that "Falen was a narrow ruling when it was
announced.").
109 At the time the criminal proceedings against the petitioner commenced, Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 57 provided that: "In all cases not provided for by rule, the
district court judges... may regulate their practices in any manner not inconsistent with
federal law, these rules, and local rules of the district." The current version of Rule 57 is
captioned "Procedure When There Is No Controlling Law" and provides that: "Ajudge
may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, these rules, and local
rules of the district."
110 Car/&/e, 116 S. Ct. at 1466.
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grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal."' The defense
asserted that the district courts possess a general supervisory power to
protect innocent defendants from wrongful convictions. 112 Carlisle
stated that the "purpose underlying the supervisory power of the fed-
eral courts is to provide a remedy for a violation of a defendant's
rights and to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction is
valid." 11 Justice Scalia conceded that federal courts may create proce-
dural rules not required by the Constitution or Congress;" 4 however,
he insisted that courts cannot use their inherent power to "circumvent
or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." 115 The
Court reviewed the case law that examined the scope of a court's su-
pervisory power and determined that the Court should respect a lower
court's well-established inherent power. 116 However, the opinions
stated that lower courts have not historically had the power to enter a
judgment of acquittal sua sponte after a guilty verdict. 117 Thus,Justice
Scalia found that Supreme Court jurisprudence did not recognize an
"inherent power" to act in opposition to the applicable Rules. 118
The Court then focused on the Petitioner's arguments that the
district court had power to enter ajudgment of acquittal pursuant to
the All Writs Act," 9 the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment,120 or the duty to avoid needless appeals. 121 Justice Scalia began
by explaining that Carlisle could not rely on the All Writs Act and the
writ of coram nobis122 because Carlisle did not ask the district court to
issue and the district court did not indicate that it was issuing a writ of
coram nobis. 123 In addition, the majority noted that the Court previ-
ously stated in Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals
Service 2 4 that the All Writs Act was a source of authority to be used
only when a statute did not address a particular issue.125 Justice Scalia
1I Id.
112 Brief of Petitioner at 9, Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. CL 1460 (1996) (No. 94-
9247).
113 Id
114 Carlisle, 116 S. CL at 1466.
115 Id (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1988)).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1467.
119 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
120 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
121 Car/is! 116 S. CL at 1467-68.
122 The writ of coram nobis was "traditionally available only to bring before the court
factual errors 'material to the validity and regularity of the legal proceeding itself.'" Id. at
1467.
128 Id.
124 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985).
125 Carlisle, 116 S. CL 1460, 1467.
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concluded that since Rule 29(c) embodies a seven-day time limit, the
All Writs Act was inapplicable. 126 The Court then addressed Carlisle's
assertion that the Due Process Clause confers on the court the author-
ity to enter a judgment of acquittal on a motion filed after the time
period provided in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (c).127 Jus-
tice Scalia dismissed the argument noting a lack of support for the
assertion and refusing to "fashion a new due process right out of thin
air."' 28 The opinion next explained that although Rule 29(c)'s time
requirements may generate additional appeals, that policy concern
does not grant the court authority to disregard the Rule. 129 The ma-
jority then focused on the consequential problems of the case. 130 Jus-
tice Scalia noted that if courts allow motions that are one day late,
then they might also have to allow motions that are ten days late.' 3'
Justice Scalia recognized that regardless of the length of the allowed
period, some individuals will always file just past the deadline.1 32
The opinion concluded by responding to some of the dissent's
arguments. 33 The majority agreed with the dissent's assertion that a
district court has the power to prevent the wrongful conviction of an
innocent defendant. 34 However, the majority differed with the dis-
sent regarding the point at which this authority terminates. 35 The
majority asserted that the supervisory power terminates when the time
limit in Rule 29 expires.1 36 In contrast, the dissent argued that the
supervisory authority extends until sentencing. 37 Justice Scalia re-
sponded to the dissent's concern that the majority opinion violates
the mandate of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 2, which requires
"simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimina-
tion of unjustifiable expense and delay."138 The majority reasoned
that negotiable time limits did not ensure simplicity or fairness nor do
they eliminate delay.' 39 The opinion examined a series of cases upon
which the dissent relied to illustrate that the Rules do not terminate
126 Id. at 1467-68.










137 Id. at 1479.




pre-existing inherent powers. 140 The majority determined that the
cases relied on by the dissent failed to "support the proposition that
permissive rules do not eliminate inherent powers."
141
Finally, the Court rejected the significance of United States v. Sis-
son,14 which the dissent relied on to support the existence of the dis-
trict court's "inherent power."143 Justice Scalia claimed that Sisson did
not address whether a court could grant a sua sponte post-verdictjudg-
ment of acquittal, but rather addressed whether the judgment being
appealed was an acquittal. 44 In the end, the Court was unwilling to
confer upon the district courts the discretion to grant untimely mo-
tions forjudgment of acquittal. Thus, the majority concluded that the
district court lacked the authority to grant Carlisle's motion for judg-
ment of acquittal that was filed one day after the time limit prescribed
by Rule 29(c) had expired. 45
B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE
Although Justice Souterjoined the majority, he wrote a separate
concurring opinion to address the extent of a district court's "inher-
ent authority." 46 Justice Souter recognized that courts might have an
"inherent power" to enter judgments of acquittal; however, he agreed
with the majority that this inherent power did not grant the district
court the authority to enter a sua spontejudgment of acquittal after the
jury had returned its verdict. 47 Although Justice Souter noted the
possibility of situations in which Congressional interference with a
court's "inherent power" would violate Article III of the United States
Constitution, he concluded that Rule 29(c) was not such an
interference. 148
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Ginsburg also joined the majority, but wrote a concurring
140 Id. (citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 870 U.S. 626 (1962) (acknowledging that district
courts have historically had the power to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution);
United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98 (1957) (involving a district court's departure
from one of its own rules); Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct 642 (1961) (holding that
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a) did not revoke a district court's authority to
revoke bail in a noncapital case)).
141 Carlisle, 116 S. CL at 1469.
142 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
14-4 Carse, 116 S. Ct. at 1469-70.
144 I& at 1470.
145 Id.
146 Id (SouterJ., concurring).
147 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
148 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
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opinion' 49 in order to examine the "one sharply honed exception" to
the strict time prescriptions embodied in Rule 29(c) and Rule
45(b). 15 0 Justice Ginsburg noted that the one exception to the time
limits embodied in Rule 29(c) and 45(b) applies to cases where the
trial judge gave incorrect information to a party who might otherwise
have taken timely action.151 Justice Ginsburg noted, however, that
Carlisle did not receive inaccurate information from the trial judge
and thus did not fall within this single exception to the Rule 29(c)
and 45(b) time provisions. 152 Justice Ginsburg recognized that the
Rules require some time restrictions and that the time limitations in
Rule 29(c) are not unreasonable. 153 Finally, Justice Ginsburg ob-
served that the other legal avenues available to Carlisle to challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction help prevent
his wrongful incarceration.
54
D. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens dissented' 55 from the majority opinion because he
felt that the real question in this case was not whether a court can
grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, but instead
whether the court can enter a judgment of acquittal when it believes
that the defendant is legally innocent1 56 Justice Stevens agreed that
courts cannot grant untimely motions for judgment of acquittal; how-
ever, he asserted that Congress did not intend to strip the courts of
their authority to protect innocent defendants. 157 Justice Stevens ar-
gued thatjudges are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that
defendants receive a fair trial, and he reviewed several cases' 58 that
recognized the court's discretion to notice and correct any error com-
mitted in the process of a trial.' 59 The dissent reviewed some of the
inherent judicial powers used to correct flaws in the legal process.160
149 Justices Souter and BreyerjoinedJustice Ginsburg in her concurrence.
150 Car&l 116 S. Ct. at 1471 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
151 Id- (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
152 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
153 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
154 Id (GinsburgJ., concurring).
155 Justice Kennedy joined justice Stevens in his dissent.
156 Cadise 116 S. Ct. at 1471 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158 See United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 197 (1939) (ordering district court to
retain funds until Secretary of Agriculture makes a determination on the reasonableness of
rates because justice requires the court to have this basis for its action); Arkadelphia Co. v.
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 249 U.S. 134, 146 (1919) ("It is one of the equitable pow-
ers, inherent in every court ofjustice ... to correct that which has been wrongfully done by
virtue of its process.") (citing Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 219 (1891)).
159 Car/isle, 116 S. Ct at 1471 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 1472 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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These inherent powers include the authority to order special confer-
ences that will aid in the disposition of a complex case, to stay pro-
ceedings to maintain the orderly progress of justice, and to allow
inspection of property belonging to third parties.
161
Justice Stevens reasoned that if the courts possessed these inher-
ent powers to ensure justice, then courts must maintain the authority
to enter a judgment of acquittal sua sponte when the courts believe
that the government has failed to prove its case. 162 The dissent as-
serted that courts have historically instructed the jury to find the ac-
cused not guilty or set aside the jury's guilty verdict if the evidence is
to the contrary.163 In cases decided before the Rules went into effect,
the trial judge would set aside the verdict and order a new trial.
164
However, once the Rules were adopted, the Supreme Court identified
possible double jeopardy problems involved with ordering a new
trial. 165 While no pre-Rule cases directly addressed a trial judge's au-
thority to order a judgment of acquittal where the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support a conviction, some cases involve the appellate courts
entering judgments of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient
to support a conviction. 166 Given the double jeopardy concerns in
modern times, Justice Stevens asserted that modern judges can "rem-
edy unsupported jury verdicts by entering judgments of acquittal"
rather than ordering a new trial.167 Justice Stevens argued that "[t]he
majority offers no principled reason for concluding that this more re-
cent remedy is beyond the power of district courts, even though the
prior remedy was not."168 The dissent concluded that a district court
possesses "error-correcting power ... so long as it retains control of
the subject matter and the parties." 169
The dissent then discussed the impact of Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 29 on Carlisle's case. 170 Justice Stevens agreed with the
majority's conclusion that the Petitioner could not file the motion for
judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 on the eighth day; however,
161 19- at 1472 nn.1-2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 1472 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 1472-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632,
659 (1896); Cady v. United States, 293 F. 829 (D.C. Cir. 1923); United States v. Harding, 26
F. Cas. 131, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1846) (No. 15,301)).
164 Carlisle, 116 S. Ct. at 1473 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165 See United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 474 (1947).
166 Carlisle, 116 S. Ct. at 1473 (StevensJ., dissenting) (citing Reiner v. United States, 92
F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1937); Cherry v. United States, 78 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1935); Nosowitz v.
United States, 282 F. 575 (2d Cir. 1922)).
167 Carlisle, 116 S. Ct. at 1474 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169 Id. (StevensJ., dissenting).
170 Id. at 1475 (StevensJ, dissenting).
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Stevens asserted that Rule 29 does not strip the court of its the author-
ity to enter a judgment of acquittal sua sponte.171 The dissent argued
that the plain language of Rule 29 does not indicate that Congress
intended to destroy the lower courts' power to enter a judgment of
acquittal sua sponte after submission to thejury. 7 2 The opinion stated,
"We do not read the mention in Rule 29(a) of a court granting such a
judgment 'on its own motion' before submission to ajury as an elimi-
nation of a court's inherent power to grant such ajudgment after sub-
mission to the jury."'73 Justice Stevens argued that upholding the
judgment of acquittal would not nullify the time limit set up in Rule
29 (c) because the time limit would control the defendant, but not the
trial judge. 7 4 The dissent asserted that the absence of the three
words "on its own motion" from the third sentence of Rule 29(c) is
not adequate reason to believe that Congress intended to strip the
district courts of their established power to review sua sponte a jury's
guilty verdict.' 75
The dissent next discussed the significance of the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Sisson, e7 6 in which a defendant's
lawyer moved post-verdict to arrest judgment under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 34.177 The district court claimed to have granted
the Rule 34 motion, but the Supreme Court stated that the district
court had actually entered a judgment of acquittal, not an arrest of
judgment.178 In Sisson, the Court stated that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure "expressly allow a federal judge to acquit a criminal de-
fendant after the jury 'returns a guilty verdict."' 179 Justice Stevens as-
serted that in Sisson, the Court gave its approval to a post-verdict order
for judgment of acquittal even though no Rule 29(c) motion was
filed.180 Consequently, Justice Stevens was "mystified" as to why the
majority now held that Rule 29(c) deprives district courts of the au-
thority to enter sua spontejudgments of acquittal.' 81
The dissent asserted that Rule 29(c) should not be read to limit
lower courts' power to access the sufficiency of the evidence sua sponte
because such an interpretation runs counter to the Court's interpre-
171 1& (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173 1& (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Maypenny, 672 F.2d 761, 764 (9th
Cir..1982)).
174 Carisle, 116 S. Ct. at 1475-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175 Id at 1476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176 899 U.S. 267 (1970).
177 Id. at 276.
178 Ca/ske, 116 S. Ct. at 1477 (StevensJ, dissenting).
179 Sisson, 399 U.S. at 290.
180 Carlise, 116 S. Ct. at 1477 (StevensJ., dissenting).
181 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tive principles. 182 Justice Stevens reviewed several cases in which the
Court refused to limit judicial power where procedural rules em-
ployed permissive language. 185 The dissent then examined several
cases in which the Court took action not authorized by the Rules be-
cause of an "interest in the even-handed administration ofjustice."
184
Justice Stevens utilized these cases to illustrate that district courts have
a power to correct anything that is wrongfully done so long as the
court retains jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. -'
As a result of this supervisory power which is not explicitly suspended
by Rule 29, the dissent argued that the district court maintained the
authority to enter a sua spontejudgment of acquittal after the expira-
tion of the time-period provided in Rule 29(c).186
Stevens concluded by examining the practical effects of allowing
courts to enter sua spontejudgments of acquittal after the expiration of
the time period embodied in Rule 29 (c). 18 7 He stated that this result
would not burden judges with an extraordinary amount of untimely
filed motions.' 88 In addition, the opinion considered the possibility
that an "Act of God" might preclude an innocent defendant from
timely filing his motion for judgment of acquittal.' 8 9 Justice Stevens
stated that this possibility requires district courts to retain authority to
"avert the conviction of a legally innocent defendant despite the ab-
sence of a timely motion."190
V. ANALYsis
This note asserts that the Court correctly determined that the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not permit the granting of an
untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, but erred when it denied
that the lower court possessed an inherent supervisory power to grant
an untimely motion. In Part A, this note asserts that the Court cor-
rectly found that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibit a
182 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 1477-78 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,
47 (1991); Link v. Wabash RLR_ Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)).
184 Carlisle, 116 S. Ct. at 1478 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Ohio Power
Co., 351 U.S. 980 (1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 98 (1957) (vacating sua sponte a previous order
denying a petition for rehearing and then granting the previously denied petition); Fer-
nandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 644 n.7 (1961) (holding that Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 46(a) did not revoke a district court's long-standing authority to revoke bail
in a noncapital case).
185 Carlisle, 116 S. Ct. at 1479 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 1479-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187 Id. at 1480 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
188 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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trial court from granting an untimely motion for judgment of acquit-
tal. In Part B, this note argues that federal district courts possess an
inherent supervisory power to ensure that legally innocent defendants
are not wrongfully convicted. Finally, in Part C, this note examines
the likely impact of this case.
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The Supreme Court correctly held that the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure prohibit a federal district court from granting a
motion for judgment of acquittal filed after the expiration of the time
limit embodied in Rule 29(c). Both the majority and dissenters
agreed on this interpretation of the Rule. 91 Rule 29(c) clearly states
that "a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed
within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such time as the
court may fix during the 7-day period."192 Furthermore, Rule 45(b)
allows for occasions when untimely acts will be considered valid.193
However, Rule 45(b) explicitly addresses actions taken pursuant to
Rule 29.194 Rule 45(b) states that "the court may not extend the time
for taking any action under Rul[e] 29 ... except to the extent and
under the conditions stated in [the Rule]." Rule 29 only allows for
extensions which are fixed by the court during the seven-day period in
which motions may be made.196 Rule 29 does not include any condi-
tions that allowed Carlisle to file his motion after the time limit ex-
pired.' 97 Thus, Rules 29(c) and 45(b) govern the motion for
judgment of acquittal submitted by Carlisle. Because the jury verdict
was returned on July 13, 1993, and because Rule 45(a)19 8 excludes
weekends from the time period, the seven-day time limit expired on
July 22, 1993. As a result, Carlisle's motion for judgment of acquittal,
filed on July 23, 1993, was invalid.
In United States v. Stevens,199 the Tenth Circuit enforced the rigid
time limit embodied in Rule 29(c).200 In Stevens, the defendant filed
his motion for judgment of acquittal outside the seven-day time limit
191 Id. at 1464, 1471.
192 FED. P. CiuM. P. 29(c).
193 FED. R. CIuM. P. 45(b).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 FED. R. CRiM. P. 29(c).
197 Id.
198 FED. R. ClM. P. 45(a). See also supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Rule 45(a).
199 978 F.2d 565 (10th Cir. 1992).
200 Id. at 569.
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without prior authorization of the court.20' As a result, the district
court refused to hear the motion claiming that it lacked the necessary
jurisdiction.20 2 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's refusal to hear the motion.
203
Carlisle argued that Rule 29 (a) allows the court to enter a judg-
ment of acquittal sua sponte.20 4 The Court correctly rejected Carlisle's
argument that Rule 29 (a) grants district courts the authority to enter
judgments of acquittal sua sponte after the case has been submitted to
the jury.20 5 Section (a) of Rule 29 is entitled "Motion Before Submis-
sion to Jury."206 Thus, it is clear that the drafters of the Rules in-
tended Rule 29 (a) to govern situations in which the defendant moves
for ajudgment of acquittal before the case is submitted to thejury. In
addition, the drafters intended Rule 29(a) to address situations in
which, after the close of evidence by either side, the court feels the
evidence is too weak to sustain a conviction. According to Rule 29 (a),
at the close of either side's evidence, the court has the authority to
enter ajudgment of acquittal sua sponte.20 7 In addition to the title of
section (a), the text of section (a) also suggests that Rule 29(a) only
applies to the period before submission to the jury. The Rule states
that the court shall order the entry of the judgment of acquittal "after
the evidence on either side is closed .... "208 If the drafters intended
for courts to be able to enter sua spontejudgments of acquittal at any
time, as Carlisle suggested, the drafters would have omitted this word-
ing entirely. The Supreme Court has previously held that "no provi-
sion should be construed to be entirely redundant."20 9 Thus, the
Court properly acknowledged the significance of language limiting
the time in which a court may grant a sua spontejudgment of acquittal.
The Rule would have been coherent without this phrase regarding
timing, so its inclusion indicates that the drafters intended to limit a
court's authority to enter sua spontejudgments of acquittal to the pe-
riod before submission to the jury.
201 Id. at 566.
202 Id
203 Id at 569.
204 Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1460 (1996)
(No. 94-9247).
205 Carlisle, 116 S. Ct. at 1464.
206 FED. 1. CRIM. P. 29(a).
207 Id
208 Id.
209 Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988).
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B. THE SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION OF AN "INHERENT SUPERVISORY
POWER"
Although the Court correctly determined that the Rules prohibit
a district court from granting an untimely motion for judgment of
acquittal, the Court erred when it denied that courts possess an inher-
ent supervisory power to prevent legally innocent defendants from be-
ing convicted. The Supreme Court has previously stated that it is "a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."2 10 As a
result, courts historically have been entrusted with the responsibility
to ensure that no criminal defendant is convicted unless the govern-
ment has produced sufficient evidence to prove every element of the
offense charged.2 11 There is no evidence that Congress intended to
strip courts of that responsibility with the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the purposes of Rule
29 (c) would not be frustrated if district courts were permitted to grant
sua sponte judgments of acquittal because the seven-day time limit
would still be applicable for motions made by the defendant. Thus,
the Court should have acknowledged that the district court main-
tained an inherent supervisory power which allowed it to grant Car-
lisle a judgment of acquittal sua sponte.
1. Judge's Duty to Secure a Fair Trial for the Litigants
Courts have long recognized that trial judges are not passive ob-
servers of the happenings in their courtrooms. In 1933, Judge
Learned Hand stated that ajudge "is affirmatively charged with secur-
ing a fair trial, and he must intervene sua sponte to that end, when
necessary."212 In Pingatore v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,2 13 the Sixth Cir-
cuit reminded district court judges of their duty to supervise the pro-
ceedings in their courtrooms. 214 In Pingatore, plaintiff's counsel used
curse words, ripped the defendant's exhibits off a blackboard, and
placed an empty chair before the jury and asked where the corpora-
tion was on that day.215 The plaintiff's counsel was attempting to prej-
udice the jury against Montgomery Ward by suggesting that the large
corporation did not care enough about the plaintiff to attend the
210 In re Wifnship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (examining the
rationale for different burdens of proof in criminal and civil trials).
211 See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
212 Brown v. Walter, 62 F.2d 798, 799 (2d Cir. 1933).
213 419 F.2d 1138 (6th Cir. 1969).




trial.216 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that the trial judge should
not have tolerated such conduct.21 7 As a result, the court reversed
and remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of damages.218
Other circuits have acknowledged a trial court's supervisory power as
well.21
9
The judge's duty to secure a fair trial is accentuated in a criminal
case.220 Since a defendant's personal liberty and reputation are at
stake in a criminal action, the importance of fairness in procedure is
enhanced. If an attorney commits an error in a civil action, the client
is free to sue the attorney for malpractice in order to recover the lost
award. However, in a criminal action, if a defense counsel commits an
error, a successful malpractice action will not make the defendant
whole. The money damages recovered in a malpractice action will not
give the defendant back the time he spent incarcerated because of the
attorney's error.221 In addition, a criminal conviction does immeasur-
able damage to an individual's reputation which cannot be restored
with a monetary award. As a result, a trial court judge must utilize his
supervisory power to ensure that the defendant is not victimized by
the judicial system. This supervisory power should authorizejudges to
prevent errors and to remedy errors that have already occurred.
2. Cases where Courts have Taken Action to Protect a Legally Innocent
Criminal Defendant
Courts have historically protected legally innocent criminal de-
fendants from wrongful convictions.2 22 Before the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellate courts reversed con-
victions when a trial court failed to enter ajudgment of acquittal when
the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.223 In Ansley v.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1144.
219 See, e.g., Pappas v. Middle Earth Condominium Ass'n, 963 F.2d 534, 540 (2d Cir.
1992) (stating that part of a trial court judge's responsibility "is the affirmative obligation
to guard against improper trial tactics that might prevent a fair verdict."); Gonzalez v.
Volvo of America Corp., 734 F.2d 1221, 1225 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The trial judge does not sit
as a passive observer who functions solely when called upon by the parties, but is required
instead to assure that each litigant is accorded a fair trial.").
220 Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 194 (1908).
221 Simko v. Blake, 532 N.W.2d 842, 849 (Mich. 1995) (Levin,J., dissenting). In Simko, a
legal malpractice case, the dissent found that even though a criminal defendant's convic-
tion was reversed because of attorney error, the criminal defendant still suffered an injury
because he was incarcerated for two years.
222 See ORFIELD & RHODES, supra note 5, at 508.
223 See, e.g., Nosowitz v. United States, 282 F. 575, 578-79 (2d Cir. 1922) (reversing a
conviction for unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquors because evidence was too weak
to support conviction and trial court should have entered judgment of acquittal).
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United States,224 the EFfth Circuit stated that the question of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence "should be raised by the court of its own mo-
tion, if necessary to prevent a miscarriage ofjustice."225 Even after the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Eleventh
Circuit followed this decision and voiced an unwillingness to elevate
the rigid structure of the Rules above justice and fairness:
The rules of criminal procedure, of course, do not demarcate the outer
limits of a trial court's authority to vacate a judgment of conviction.
Under its inherent supervisory power, a district court may consider an
untimely post-trial motion forjudgment of acquittal or may grant such a
motion sua sponte to correct manifest error when it retains jurisdiction
over the case .... [I]f a district court has jurisdiction over a case, then
the interests of justice demand that it review the sufficiency of the evi-
dence for conviction without regard to the technicalities of pleading.
2 26
In United States v. Deans,2 27 the Third Circuit also refused to abide
by the rigid time limits embodied in the Rules. 228 In Deans, a criminal
defendant failed to file a notice of appeal within the applicable time
period. 229 The court acknowledged that the time limits "had been
described as 'mandatory and jurisdictional."' 25 0 However, the court
found that the defendant learned of his right to appeal more than
forty days after his sdtencing.231 As a result, the court found that "a
strict application of the Federal Rules so as to effectively deny the de-
fendant's right to appeal would create a harsh result."232 To remedy
this injustice, the court adopted a rule which stated that the time limit
for filing a notice of appeal does not begin to run until the defendant
is notified of his right to appeal. 233 Thus, the defendant's appeal was
found to be valid.23 4 Deans is an example of a district court disregard-
ing the strict time limits included in the Rules in order to ensure jus-
tice is served for an individual defendant. Although Deans presented a
different factual scenario than Carlisle, the decision in Deans illustrates
that courts do invoke their supervisory power to develop rules which
conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme
Court's refusal to grant certiorari in Deans235 suggests that the Court
224 135 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1943).
225 Id. at 208.
226 United States v. DiBernardo, 880 F.2d 1216, 1225 n.4 (11th Cir. 1989) (citations
omitted).
227 436 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1971).







235 See United States v. Deans, 403 U.S. 911 (1971).
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did not find the use of the supervisory power in Deans to be so offen-
sive as to warrant consideration.
Given this history of allowing courts to set aside unsubstantiated
convictions and given the duty courts have to prevent the wrongful
conviction of legally innocent defendants, the district court in Carlisle
clearly retained a supervisory power which allowed it to grant Carlisle
ajudgment of acquittal sua sponte.
3. Purposes of Rule 29
The goals of Rule 29 would not be frustrated if trial courts re-
tained the authority to grant motions for judgment of acquittal sua
sponte after the expiration of the seven-day time limit in Rule 29(c).
The advisory committee's note to Rule 29 does not enumerate the
reasons behind the adoption of Rule 29(c).23 6 However, Justice Ste-
vens suggested several considerations which probably encouraged its
adoption.23 7 Justice Stevens asserted that Rule 29 aimed to prevent
trial judges from reviewing a record after they had forgotten their im-
pressions of the credibility of the witnesses. 238 This supervisory power
to grant sua spontejudgments of acquittal to avoid injustice applies up
until the time of sentencing, because after sentencing, trial court
judges no longer have jurisdiction over a case. Judges preside over
sentencing hearings shortly after the conclusion of a criminal trial.
Thus, it is unlikely that a trial court judge would be forced to recon-
sider a record with which he was no longer familiar.
Justice Stevens also asserted that the drafters of Rule 29 intended
to force defense counsel to act promptly.239 Even if the Court had
said that trial courts retain a supervisory power which allows them to
grant sua spontejudgments of acquittal until after sentencing, the de-
fendant would still be required to file the motion within the seven-day
time limit embodied in Rule 29(c). 240 Defense counsel would not rely
on the discretion of the district court to enter the judgment of acquit-
tal sua sponte because courts would reserve that authority for cases in-
volving great injustice. Thus, defense counsel would still file their
motions in a timely fashion. Since allowing courts to grant sua sponte
judgments of acquittal in cases where justice so required would not
frustrate the likely purposes and goals of Rule 29, the Court should
have found that district courts retain such authority.
The majority suggested that the drafters intended Rule 29 to alle-
236 FED. R GRIM. P. 29(c) advisory committee's note.
237 Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1460, 1475 (1996) (StevensJ., dissenting).
238 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240 Id. (Stevens, J, dissenting).
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viate concern about the potential for abuse of discretion by trial
courts judges.2 41 There is no reason to believe that a judge who had
the authority to grant a judgment of acquittal throughout'a proceed-
ing and who declined to do so would then enter an unjustifiable judg-
ment of acquittal after the return of the jury verdict. There is always
potential for abuse in the judicial system, but fear of abuse should not
force the Court to strip judges of their power to ensure fairness and
justice. In Carlisle, the Court stripped judges of their supervisory au-
thority to prevent injustice resulting from an abuse of discretion; how-
ever, in the process, the Court allows injustices which stem from flaws
in procedure.
C. FUTURE IMPACT OF CARLMSLE V. UITED STAET.S
The Supreme Court's decision in Carlisle v. United Stated 42 in-
structs trial court judges that they cannot consider untimely motions
for judgment of acquittal regardless of the accompanying circum-
stances. 243 Several post-Carlisle decisions demonstrate that the lower
courts are acting accordingly. In United States v. Calderon,244 the de-
fendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal several months after
the expiration of the seven-day time limit.245 Nevertheless, the district
court granted the motion.246 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial
court's order granting the defendant's motion for judgment of acquit-
tal.247 The Eleventh Circuit relied on Carlisle to support its assertion
that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion.2 48
In United States v. Bordeaux,249 the Eighth Circuit also followed the
Supreme Court's instruction from Carlisle.250 In Bordeaux, a jury
found the defendant guilty of abusive sexual contact by force.2' This
was the lesser of two crimes submitted to the jury for consideration. 252
The defendant failed to file a motion for a new trial within the seven-
241 Ird at 1464.
242 116 S. Ct. 1460 (1996).
243 Id. at 1464.




248 Id see also United States v. Dumas, 94 F.3d 286 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Car i l to
support its finding that since defendant's notice of appeal was not untimely because of
reliance on a misstatement of the district court, the narrow exception to the Rule's time
limit did not apply and thus the appeal was dismissed).
249 92 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 1996).





day time limit prescribed by Rule 33.253 After the verdict was entered
and a date for sentencing was set, the government admitted that the
jury instruction on the lesser offense "failed to include the essential
element of force."254 As a result, the district court sua sponte granted a
new trial on the lesser offense. 255 Relying on Carlisle v. United States,
the Eighth Circuit held that the district court lacked the authority to
grant the defendant a new trial because the defendant had not filed a
motion within the allowable time period.2 56 Consequently, the Eighth
Circuit remanded the case to the district court so that sentence could
be imposed for the conviction of the lesser offense.
2 57
United States v. Bordeaux is another example ofjustice's subordina-
tion to rigid formalism. In Bordeaux, the district court judge contem-
plated the various ways to remedy the erroneous jury instruction.2
8
The judge acknowledged that if he did not grant a new trial, the de-
fendant would appeal and the appellate court would almost certainly
grant a new trial.259 The trial judge granted the new trial so that the
defendant would not have to sit in jail for up to a year waiting for the
appellate court to order a new trial.260 The district court followed the
mandate of Rule 2, which instructs a judge to secure "fairness in ad-
ministration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay."26'
Although the Court's holding in Carlisle262 only addressed the
flexibility of time limits under the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, lower courts have cited Carlisle to explain their strict adherence
to other procedural rules. In United States v. McVeigh,263 a district
court in Colorado relied on Carlisle to prohibit the distribution of au-
dio tapes of court proceedings. The court determined that since the
recordings were not made for the purpose of making the official rec-
ord, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53 prohibited their distribu-
tion.264 The court stated that it had no choice but to forbid the
distribution of the tapes, because under Carlisle, a district court "has





257 Id at 608.
258 Id at 607-08 n.2.
259 I&
260 Id
261 FED. R. CRIM. P. 2.
262 116 S. Ct. 1460 (1996).
263 931 F. Supp. 753, 755 (D. Colo. 1996).
264 Id at 756.
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Criminal Procedure."265 Thus, Carlisle is being read by courts to ap-
ply to much more than cases involving time limits. Carlisle effectively
strips district courts of any discretion they once possessed and forces
them to follow precisely every Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure re-
gardless of extraordinary circumstances.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note concludes that the Court correctly determined that the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibit district courts from
granting untimely motions for judgment of acquittal. The text of
Rules 29 (c) and 45(b) explicitly state that actions taken under Rule 29
must be concluded before the expiration of the relevant time period.
However, this Note further concludes that the majority incorrectly de-
termined that district courts do not possess an inherent supervisory
power which would allow them to grant a judgment of acquittal sua
sponte where the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction.
The majority was so concerned with following the Rules that it lost
sight of the fundamental principles of justice and fairness which are
central to our legal system.
DAWN M. PHILLIPS
265 Id at 755.
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